

Estimating the Probability of a Timely Traffic-Hazard Warning via Simulation

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Interdisciplinary Research Center on
Critical Systems Engineering for
Socio-Technical Systems




January 12, 2015

Agenda I

- 1 Brief Problem Outline
- 2 Practical Application
- 3 Conclusion


Underlying question

- ▶ How reliable are hazard warning systems?
- ▶ A car approaches a hazard.
- ▶ A hazard on its path is a safety threat.
- ▶ The threat can only be assessed on close range.
- ▶ Cars between ego-car and hazard can propagate a warning.




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
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
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Simulation:

- ▶ specify **fixed** parameters: distance to hazard, velocity of ego car, communication range of cars
- ▶ specify **dynamic** parameters: velocity of other cars, number of other cars
- ▶ goal: determine how **reliability** depends on (dynamic) parameters
- ▶ reliability: successful relay of warning message via other cars before ego car reaches safety threshold in front of hazard (i.e. breaking distance)

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
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
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
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
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
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Three (+1) settings

1. How many trials are necessary to get resilient results?
2. How does the velocity interval of other cars influence the results?
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Setting 1: The necessary number of trials





Figure: 10 trials

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



Figure: 1.000 trials

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





Figure: 100.000 trials

Setting 2: The velocity interval



Setting 3: The communication range



Lessons learned

- ▶ **Number of simulations should not be fixed.**
- ▶ The velocity interval has **minor** influence on results.
- ▶ The radio range has **major** influence on results.
- ▶ The number of cars need a critical mass based on other parameters for warning mechanisms to be effective.

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Future work

- ▶ **Employ Hoeffding to determine number of simulations.**
- ▶ Switch to SUMO & OMNET++ for better traffic simulation.
- ▶ Determine security weak spots caused by unequal distributions (e.g. traffic backlog).
- ▶ Tackle larger and realistic scenarios.

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Questions?