

# Informatik-Kolloquium

Am **Montag, den 27. Oktober 2008.** um **16:15** Uhr hält

**Prof. Dr. Krzysztof R. Apt**

Center for Mathematics and Informatics (CWI)  
and  
University of Amsterdam (UvA)

einen Vortrag mit dem Titel

**“Socially Optimal Mechanisms”**

Der Vortrag findet im OFFIS-Gebäude, Escherweg 2, Konferenzraum F02 statt.

## **Zusammenfassung:**

The purpose of mechanism design, sometimes called reverse game theory, is to align agents's preferences so that the decision taken by the central authority is beneficial for the society.

A natural objective is to look for solutions that generate maximal social welfare. So in the case of a single item auction we would not aim at maximizing seller's utility but at minimizing it, which corresponds to determining at the least social cost who values the item most.

We discuss our recent results concerning maximizing social welfare in simultaneous and in sequential mechanisms. They are concerned with the single item auction and the public project problem. In the public project problem a decision must be made whether to construct a discrete public good (say a bridge) without knowledge of the utility functions of the interested players.

The lecture will start with a short introduction to the mechanism design, the subject of the 2007 Nobel prize in Economics. (Based on works with V. Conitzer, A. Estevez-Fernandez, M.Guo and V. Markakis.)

**Eingeladen von Prof. Dr. E.-R. Olderog**

*Weitere Kolloquiumstermine sind im WWW abrufbar.*